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Abstract
How can policy-makers avoid large policy errors when they are uncertain about the true model of
the economy? The author discusses some recent approaches that can be used for that purpose
under two alternative scenarios: (i) the policy-maker has one reference model for choosing policy
but cannot take a stand as to how that model is misspeciﬁed, and (ii) the policy-maker, being
uncertain about the economy’s true structure, entertains multiple distinct models of the
economy. The author shows how these approaches can be implemented in practice using as
benchmark models simpliﬁed versions of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005).
JEL classiﬁcation: E5, E58, D8, D81
Bank classiﬁcation: Uncertainty and monetary policy
Résumé
Comment les autorités peuvent-elles éviter de grosses erreurs dans le choix de leur politique
monétaire lorsqu’elles ne savent pas quel modèle de l’économie est le plus indiqué? L’auteur
expose quelques-unes des méthodes avancées récemment à cette ﬁn en distinguant deux cas de
ﬁgure : i) les décideurs se réfèrent à un seul modèle, mais ignorent lesquels de ses éléments ont
été mal spéciﬁés; ii) les décideurs retiennent plusieurs modèles différents parce qu’ils ne
connaissent pas la véritable structure de l’économie. En s’appuyant sur des versions simpliﬁées
des modèles proposés par Fuhrer et Moore (1995) et par Christiano, Eichenbaum et Evans (2005),
l’auteur montre comment les méthodes considérées peuvent être mises concrètement à proﬁt.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E5, E58, D8, D81
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Incertitude et politique monétaire1. Introduction
Suppose that, as a policy-maker at the Bank of Canada, you are presented with Figure 1.
The solid line shows how in°ation and the output gap respond to an unanticipated 1 per
cent increase in the nominal interest rate according to a simpli¯ed version of the Fuhrer and
Moore (1995) model (hereafter, FM model) estimated for Canada. The dotted line shows
the corresponding impulse responses according to a simpli¯ed version of the Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) model (hereafter, CEE model)(see Dennis 2004), calibrated
for the Canadian economy.
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1magnitude of e®ects, the duration of the e®ects, and the dynamic path of those variables
after the change in policy. And because they have di®erent implications about the policy
transmission mechanism, the models will, in general, lead to di®erent policy implications.
Indeed, a policy-maker concerned with controlling in°ation, who believes that the Canadian
economy is well represented by the CEE model, will presumably consider that increasing
the interest rate is an e®ective way of combatting in°ation; a 1 per cent increase in the
interest rate reduces in°ation by 0.72 per cent after 4 quarters, and in°ation is stabilized
after about 16 quarters. If a policy-maker, however, views the FM model as the reference
model for Canada, then that policy-maker will presumably consider that the interest rate is
not a very e®ective instrument for controlling in°ation; a 1 per cent increase in the interest
rate reduces in°ation by 0.07 per cent after 14 quarters!
The root of the di±culty in choosing policy in the above example lies in the fact that
the policy-maker entertains two models of the economy that predict fairly di®erent e®ects
of policy. In practice, it is not unusual to ¯nd di®erent departments in central banks
using di®erent models to help their policy analysis. At the Bank of Canada, the Research
Department uses TOTEM (Binette, Murchison, Perrier, and Rennison 2004) and policy
analysis, while the Monetary and Financial Analysis Department is currently developing a
model that emphasizes household sector ¯nancial frictions in the economy (Gammoudi and
Mendes 2005). But even if the policy-maker uses one reference model for policy analysis, it
does not mean that model uncertainty is not a concern. Indeed, any model is a simpli¯cation
of a more complex reality. So, what if the reference model is misspeci¯ed? What if the model
is built around an economic paradigm that is further than assumed from the economic
reality? Or what if it ignores economic relationships that are in fact relevant?
In this paper, we discuss some recent approaches to dealing with model uncertainty where
the policy-maker has one reference model for policy-making or has multiple reference models.
We present the theoretical ideas behind each approach, use simple examples to illustrate
what each approach does, and discuss when a particular approach may be preferable. But
we do not limit ourselves to a theoretical discussion. We show how to sensibly determine
the various parameters that a theoretical discussion takes for granted that are nonetheless
essential ingredients in practical applications. We also work through the implementation
using as a benchmark the simpli¯ed CEE and FM models (described in section 3.1).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theory behind
robust control and other concepts that are necessary for implementing robust control in
2practice. Section 3 implements robust control in the CEE and FM models. Section 4
describes various multiple-model approaches (Bayesian, worst-case, and trade-o® (Cateau
2005)), and implements the methods when the policy-maker is uncertain between the CEE
and FM models. Section 5 o®ers some conclusions.
2. Robust Control
2.1 The intuition behind robust control
Suppose, to start, that the policy-maker has one model of the economy. Suppose further
that the policy-maker considers it a good approximating model of the economy, but feels
that it may deviate from some unknown true model in possibly important ways. How should
the policy-maker make decisions in such a situation? Robust control is designed to work
well in this scenario.
The main feature of robust control is that it formally allows the decision-maker to rec-
ognize that data may not be generated by the approximating model but by an unknown
member of a set of models near the approximating model. Robust control provides a way
for the decision-maker to make decisions that would perform well over the set of nearby
models. Therefore, robust control aims to yield decisions that would work reasonably well
even if the approximating model does not coincide with the true data-generating model, as








Figure 2: Robust decision making
In Figure 2, the decision-maker speci¯es a model, f, but suspects that the data are actually
generated by a nearby model, f0, which cannot be speci¯ed. In robust control, the decision-
3maker confronts the model uncertainty by ¯rst recognizing that there are speci¯cation errors
(say, !) and then seeking a decision rule that will work well, not only for the approximating
model but for a set of models in the neighbourhood of f. To express the idea that f is
a good approximating model, the neighbourhood of f for which the decision-maker wants
a decision rule that works well is restricted to the set of models for which the size of the
speci¯cation errors (say, S(!)) is bounded by a certain value, ». Thus, » represents how
much the decision-maker believes that f is a good approximating model. A larger » means
that the decision-maker believes the true model is further apart and therefore considers a
wider set of models around f, and vice versa. Finally, to ensure that the decisions made
perform well even when f 6= f0, robust control instructs the decision-maker to make decisions
according to the worst-case model in the set.
2.2 Robust control µ a la Hansen-Sargent
Since Hansen and Sargent (2004), the literature on robust control has expanded considerably,
and there are now di®erent ways of implementing robust control versions of decision-making
problems. The discussion below follows the approach of Hansen and Sargent (2004) because
it can be more easily implemented than the other approaches suggested in the literature
(Giannoni 2002, Onatski and Williams 2003), is non-parametric, and is general.
Let Xt be a vector of state variables and Ut be the vector of controls to be chosen at
time t, and let the policy-maker's model take the form of the linear transition law,
Xt+1 = AXt + BUt + C· ²t+1; (1)
where f· ²tg is an identically, independently distributed (i.i.d.) shock process with mean
0 and identity covariance matrix. Suppose that the policy-maker regards model (1) as
approximating another model that he cannot specify. How should the notion that model
(1) is misspeci¯ed be represented? The i.i.d. process f· ²tg, by de¯nition, can represent
only a very limited class of approximation errors and, in particular, it cannot represent
misspeci¯ed dynamics, since it does not in°uence the conditional mean of the state. To
represent dynamic misspeci¯cation, Hansen and Sargent (2004) suggest surrounding model
(1) by a set of models of the form
Xt+1 = AXt + BUt + C(²t+1 + !t+1); (2)
where f²tg is another i.i.d. shock process with mean 0 and identity covariance matrix, !t+1
4is a vector process that can feed back on the history of Xt in a possibly non-linear way,
!t+1 = gt(Xt;Xt¡1;:::);
and gt is a sequence of measurable functions. In what sense does augmenting model (1) to (2)
allow for dynamic misspeci¯cation? When model (2) generates the data, the errors f· ²tg of
model (1) have conditional mean !t+1, rather than 0. Thus, the idea that the approximating
model is misspeci¯ed is captured by allowing the conditional mean of the shock process of
model (2) that actually generates the data to feed back on the history of the state.
To express the idea that model (1) is a good approximation when model (2) generates
the data, the misspeci¯cation errors must not be unbounded. Hansen and Sargent (2004)







t+1!t+1 · ´0; (3)
where Et denotes mathematical expectation conditioned on Xt = (Xt;Xt¡1;Xt¡2;:::) calcu-
lated with model (2).
The policy-maker believes that the data are generated by model (2) with some unknown
process, !t+1, satisfying (3). The policy-maker's distrust of the approximating model leads
the policy-maker to want decision rules that perform well over a set of models (2) satisfying














subject to (2), given (3) and X0. Therefore, robust control involves switching from a typical
minimization problem (the policy-maker minimizes the loss function) to an appropriately
speci¯ed min-max problem.1 The policy function that the policy-maker ultimately chooses is
best understood as the equilibrium outcome of a two-player game: the policy-maker chooses
the best possible policy, given that a ¯ctitious evil agent whose purpose is to hurt the policy-
maker as much as possible chooses the worst model from the possible set of models. The
1In Appendix A, I work out the solution to the above robust control problem. For generality, I assume that
Xt includes both backward-looking state variables (i.e., states inherited from the past) and forward-looking
variables (i.e., state variables not inherited from the past but that need to be determined in equilibrium).
I work out the mechanics of the robust solution under two cases: (i) the policy-maker chooses the fully
optimal policy rule (Ramsey solution), and (ii) the policy-maker chooses policy according to a simple rule.
5evil agent is a metaphor for the policy-maker being cautious. The policy-maker's cautious
behaviour implies that the policy-maker wants a policy function (i.e., a Ut) that would
perform well should the worst possible model generate the data.
The robust control problem described above is set up as a constraint game. The con-
straint game directly constrains the distortions that the evil agent can make to the ap-
proximating model through the constraint (3). In practical applications, it is often more



















subject to (1), given X0. Thus, the multiplier game penalizes the distortions that the evil
agent can make. Hansen and Sargent (2004) show that the two formulations are equivalent
under conditions that allow the Lagrange multiplier theorem to apply. Then µ can be
interpreted as a Lagrange multiplier on the constraint measuring the size of the set of
models. It is related to ´0 in (3). Hansen and Sargent (2004), in fact, show that there
is a positive relationship between ´0 and µ¡1. Because µ = 1 corresponds to ´0 = 0,
µ corresponds to the case where the set of models collapses to the approximating model;
there is no desire for robustness.2 On the other hand, lowering µ and thereby increasing ´0
increases the preference for robustness.
2.3 The sense in which robust control yields robust decision rules
To determine how robust control yields robust decisions, let us analyze a simple static robust
control problem that can be solved using pen and paper. Let U;¼;¼e be the unemployment
rate, the in°ation rate, and the public's expected rate of in°ation, respectively, and suppose
that the policy-maker's model is:
U = U
¤ ¡ °(¼ ¡ ¼e) + ^ ²; (6)
2Equivalently consider setting µ to 1 in (5). Since the objective is to minimize loss, µ = 1 sets the loss
function to ¡1 irrespective of the value that !t+1 takes. Therefore, µ = 1 corresponds to the case where
there is no role for the evil agent; the agent can do nothing to harm the policy-maker. This corresponds to
the case where there is no desire for robustness. Lowering µ, however, reduces the shadow price of achieving
some robustness. Hansen and Sargent (2004) show that there is a lower bound on µ below which µ cannot be
set. For values of µ below that bound, the evil agent is penalized so little for distorting the approximating
model that the agent can ¯nd a distortion that sends the loss function of the policy-maker to +1.
6where ° > 0 and ^ ² is N(0;1). Thus, U¤ is the natural rate of unemployment that prevails on
average if ¼ = ¼e. The policy-maker sets ¼, the public sets ¼e, and nature draws ^ ². Suppose
that the policy-maker believes that the model may be misspeci¯ed and, as a result, suppose
that the policy-maker views (6) as an approximation because of a suspicion that U may
actually be governed by
U = U
¤ ¡ °(¼ ¡ ¼e) + ² + w; (7)
where ² is another random variable distributed as N(0;1) and w is an unknown distortion
to the mean. Thus, the policy-maker suspects that the natural rate of unemployment might
be U¤ + w for some unknown w. The policy-maker, however, knowing that (6) is a good
approximating model, knows that the distortion is not too big. To capture that notion,
suppose that the policy-maker considers distortions that fall in the set:
w
2 · »: (8)
Therefore, the policy-maker, although unable to determine the distortion to the mean, knows
that the squared deviation is bounded by ».




In robust control, given that the policy-maker believes that (7) generates U, the policy-maker








subject to (7), (8):
In other words, the policy-maker chooses ¼ such that it works well for the worst possible
distortion, w, that falls in the set given by (8). The above robust control problem can be
solved by writing the Lagrangian
L(¼;w;µ) = (U




where µ can be seen as the Lagrange multiplier3 for constraint (8), and ² and the expectation
operator are omitted without loss of generality, because of certainty equivalence. The ¯rst-
3As mentioned in section 2.2, there is a connection between µ and ». For now, we take this as given, but
in section 2.4 we describe how to pin down a reasonable µ using detection probabilities.
7order conditions are:
¼ : ¼ = °(U
¤ ¡ °(¼ ¡ ¼e) + w); (10)
w : µw = U
¤ ¡ °(¼ ¡ ¼e) + w: (11)





(1 + °2) ¡ µ¡1
¶
(U





(1 + °2) ¡ µ¡1
¶
(U
¤ + °¼e): (13)
The solutions (12) and (13) for ¼ and w, respectively, are in terms of the inverse of the
multiplier. De¯ne ¾ = µ¡1 and consider Figure 3.
























Figure 3: The sense in which robust control yields robustness
Figure 3 illustrates the sense in which robust control yields a robust decision for ¼. We
8assume that U¤ = 4, ° = 1, and take ¼e = 2 as given. The graph plots the value of
E(U2 + ¼2) associated with setting ¼ = ¼(¾1) when w = w(¾2). The idea, therefore, is to
check how costly it is to make mistakes: in°ation is set according to a certain assumption on
the size of the speci¯cation error, which may turn out to be wrong. ¾2 is varied between 0
and 4.5, while ¾1 is allowed to take two values: 0, and 5. The solid line is the value of the loss
criterion for ¾1 = 0, while the dotted line refers to ¾1 = 5. Notice how the two curves cross:
the ¾1 = 0 curve minimizes loss when there is no speci¯cation error (i.e., ¾2 = 0, which
implies w = 0), but its performance deteriorates rapidly as the speci¯cation error increases
along the ¾2 axis. The robust rule, on the other hand, sacri¯ces performance when there is
no distortion to the mean. But its performance deteriorates less rapidly as the speci¯cation
error increases.
2.4 Choosing the degree of robustness, µ: detection-error
probabilities
So far, we have taken µ as given; thus, the policy-maker knows the size of the set of models
surrounding the approximating model to consider in the robust decision-making problem.
But how can the policy-maker determine the size of the set of surrounding models in practice?
This question is particularly important in a linear quadratic set-up, because the evil agent's
constraint always binds.4 Therefore, a policy-maker who gets ready for the worst chooses
decision rules for policy tailored on a model lying on the boundary of the set of models from
which the evil agent can choose. The decision rules in a linear quadratic robust control
problem will hence depend on µ. It is therefore crucial to make a sensible choice for µ.
As a guide to choosing µ, Hansen and Sargent (2004) suggest a detection-error-probability
approach based on the idea that if it is di±cult to statistically distinguish between the models
in the set, in a data sample of ¯nite size, then there is a possibility of making the wrong
choice of models when determining the true data-generating model. Hansen and Sargent's
detection-error-probability approach disciplines the choice of µ by linking it to the probability
of making the wrong choice of model. Essentially, this is how the approach works: (i) the
decision-maker takes an agnostic position on whether the true data-generating process is
given by the approximating model or the worst-case model, (ii) he computes the detection-
error probability, i.e., probability of making the wrong choice between the two models on
4Since ¯rst-order conditions are linear, the most the evil agent can hurt the policy-maker is by choosing
a model that deviates the most from the approximating model. Thus, the best choice the evil agent can
make is to choose a model on the boundary of the set of models.
9the basis of in-sample ¯t in a data-sample of ¯nite size, (iii) he chooses µ on the basis of the
detection-error probability that he wants to achieve. In the sections below, we give a more
formal de¯nition of the detection-error probabilities; we describe how to compute them and
how they can be related to µ.
2.4.1 Detection-error probabilities and the degree of robustness
Consider the approximating model (1) and the distorted model (2). For a given decision
rule Ut = FXt and a worst-case distortion !t+1 = K(µ)Xt when the degree of robustness is
µ, de¯ne A0 = A + BF and ^ A = A + BF + CK(µ). The approximating model can then be
depicted as
Xt+1 = A0Xt + C· ²t+1 (14)
and the distorted model can be represented as
Xt+1 = ^ AXt + C²t+1: (15)
Now assume that · ²t+1 and ²t+1 are both Gaussion vector process with mean 0 and
identity covariance matrices. Detection error probabilities are calculated from likelihood
ratios. Thus, consider our two alternative models. Model A is the approximating model
(14), and model B is the distorted model (15) associated with the context-speci¯c worst-case
shock implied by µ. Consider a ¯xed sample of observations on the state xt, t = 0;:::;T ¡1.
Let Lij be the likelihood of that sample for model j assuming that model i generates the





where j 6= i and i = A;B. When model i generates the data, ri should be positive. But in
a sample of ¯nite size, we may mistakenly conclude that model j generates the data if Lij
turns out to be greater than Lii. So supposing that we replicated data a large number of
times and computed the likelihood ratio ri for each sample, the probability of mistakenly
concluding that model j generates the data when in fact model i is the true data-generating
model is
pi = freq(ri · 0): (17)
Thus, pi is the frequency of negative log-likelihood ratios ri when model i is true. Hansen




(pA + pB): (18)
The probability of a detection error is therefore the average of two kinds of mistakes: (i)
concluding that model B generates the data when it is in fact model A and (ii) concluding
that model A generates data when it is in fact model B. Here, µ is the robustness parameter
used to generate a particular distorted model B. In a given context, Hansen and Sargent
(2004) propose to choose µ by setting p(µ) to a reasonable number and then inverting p(µ).
In other words, if the decision-maker wanted to achieve a detection error probability of 10
per cent, he would pick the µ, say ^ µ, that yields p(^ µ) = 0:1.
2.4.2 Computing detection-error probabilities
We now derive formulae for Lii and Ljj and provide a recipe for computing detection-error
probabilities under our assumption that · ²t+1 and ²t+1 are Gaussian processes with mean 0
and identity covariance matrix. First notice that we can relate the innovations under the
approximating model and worst-case model by
· ²t+1 = !t+1 + ²t+1
= K(µ)Xt + ²t+1:
Now suppose that the approximating model is the true data-generating model. De¯ning
XA
t as data generated from the approximating model and !A
t+1 = K(µ)XA
t as the worst-
case distortion, the relationship between the innovations when the approximating model
generates data is
· ²t+1 = !
A
t+1 + ²t+1:












(· ²t+1 ¢ · ²t+1)
ª
: (19)




































Hence, assuming that the approximating model is the data-generating process, the likelihood
ratio rA is





















Suppose, on the other hand, that the distorted model (15) generates the data. De¯ning
!B
t+1 = K(µ)XB
t as the worst-case distortion where XB
t is generated from the distorted
model, we can similarly show that





















Now that we know how to compute the likelihood ratios for a given sample of size T, we
compute the detection-error probability as follows:
(i) For a given µ, compute F and K(µ) given the distorted model (2) and the loss function
of the policy-maker.
(ii) For a given µ, use F and K(µ) to pin down matrices A0 and ^ A for the approximating
model (14) and distorted model (15), respectively. Generate a sample j, fXA
j;t : t =
0;1;:::;Tg according to the approximating model and a sample fXB
j;t : t = 0;1;:::;Tg
according to the distorted model. Compute the likelihood ratios rA and rB for sample
j according to (23) and (25) respectively.
(iii) Repeat steps 2 and 3 above for samples j = 1;:::;J. Compute pi = freq(ri < 0);i =
A;B and compute the detection-error probability p(µ) = 1
2(pA + pB).
(iv) Repeat steps 1, 2, and 3 for di®erent µs. This will give us a pro¯le linking p(µ) and µ.
12(v) Supposing that the decision-maker wants to achieve a detection-error probability of
p¤, determine the degree of robustness that will yield a detection-error probability of
p¤ as p(µ¤) = p¤.
3. Implementing Robust Control
We now consider a policy-maker whose problem is to set monetary policy according to the
following simple rule
it = ½iit¡1 + ½¼¼t + ½xxt: (26)
The policy-maker has a well-de¯ned reference model for carrying policy analysis but is,
however, concerned that the reference model may depart from the economic reality in some
unknown but potentially important way. As a result, the policy-maker uses robust control
to allow for those unknown deviations. In the analysis that follows, we will apply robust
control in turn to two candidate reference models: a simpli¯ed version of Fuhrer and Moore
(1995) and a simpli¯ed version of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Our objective
is to compute the theoretical objects de¯ned in section 2 and provide a practical example
of how robust control a®ects policy choice under di®erent models.
3.1 The models
The ¯rst model we consider is a simpli¯ed version of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) which we
estimate for Canada over the period 1962Q1-2005Q1 by full information maximum likeli-
hood.5 The version of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) that we estimate assumes a world where
agents negotiate nominal-wage contracts that remain in e®ect for three quarters. In°ation
is de¯ned as
¼t = 4(pt ¡ pt¡1) (27)






5We use the AIM algorithm to implement this. See Anderson and Moore (1985).
13where the weight, fi, is given by fi = 1=3 + (1 ¡ i)s. The real contract price index, vt, is




fi(wt¡i ¡ pt¡i): (29)
Agents determine the current real contract price as a function of the real contract prices
that are expected to prevail over the duration of the contract, adjusted for excess demand
conditions and an identically, independently distributed (i.i.d.) shock,
wt ¡ pt =
2 X
i=0
fiEt(vt+i + cx xt+i) + ²w;t: (30)
The aggregate demand relation makes the output gap a function of its own lags and the ex
ante long-term real interest rate, ½t:
xt = a1xt¡1 + a2xt¡2 ¡ a½½t¡1 + ²x;t: (31)
½t is de¯ned, according to the pure expectations' hypothesis, as a weighted average of the
future short-term real interest rate,
½t = d Et½t+1 + (1 ¡ d)(it ¡ Et¼t+1): (32)
We set d to 40=41, or an average bond-holding period of 40 quarters (see Fuhrer and Moore
1995). Therefore, in the FM model, the short-term nominal interest rate it - the policy-
maker's policy instrument - in°uences the output gap only through its e®ect on the long-term
interest rate.
The second model we consider follows Dennis (2003) to derive a simpli¯ed version of
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). The model assumes that a ¯xed proportion
of ¯rms 1 ¡ »p re-optimize their price every period (Calvo 1983). The remaining propor-
tion of ¯rms, »p, indexes their price change to last period's in°ation rate following Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). The ¯rst-order condition for optimal price-setting,
combined with price-indexation by non-optimizing ¯rms and log-linearized around a non-








(1 ¡ ¯»p)(1 ¡ »p)
(1 + ¯)»p
(xt + ut) (33)
14where ¯ is the discount rate and ut is an i.i.d. shock.6 Dennis (2003) assumes household pref-
erences to exhibit habit formation. The log-linearized ¯rst-order condition for the household










Et(it ¡ ¼t+1 ¡ gt) (34)
where ° is the parameter indexing the degree of habit formation, ¾ is the parameter deter-
mining the curvature of the household's utility function with respect to consumption relative
to habit, and gt is an i.i.d. shock. Following Murchison, Rennison, and Zhu (2004), we set
¯ = 0:99, ° = 0:85, ¾ = 1=0:92, and »p = 0:5. We then calibrate the standard errors of ut
and gt so that the long-run variances of in°ation, output gap, and interest rate match those
estimated from a VAR (see Appendix D).
The policy-maker is assumed to set it according to the simple rule (26) to minimize a















Both the FM and CEE models can be put in state space form to ¯t equation (1) once we
determine the forward-looking and predetermined state variables. Once the state vector is
determined, we can similarly write (35) in the quadratic form given in (4). The solution
methods described in Appendixes A and B can therefore be applied. To implement robust
control, it is necessary to choose µ; i.e., the size of the set of models surrounding the reference
model. In the next section, we compute detection probabilities to discipline the choice of µ.
3.2 Detection probabilities
We follow the steps in section 2.4.2 to compute detection probabilities for each model and
make a suitable choice of µ, which dictates the size of the set of models the policy-maker
considers when developing policy. Figure 4 plots the detection-error probabilities for distin-
guishing the FM model from the worst-case models associated with various choices of µ¡1.
Notice that when µ¡1 = 0, the detection-error probability is 0.5. This is what it should
be since, when µ¡1 = 0, the approximating and the worst-case model are the same. When
µ¡1 increases, we admit more models in the set of models surrounding the approximating
model. As a result, the probability of distinguishing the approximating model from the
6The i.i.d. shock appears because the f.o.c. relates in°ation to the ¯rm's marginal cost, mct, which is
assumed to be related to the output gap by mct = xt + ut.

































Figure 4: Detection-error probabilities for the FM model
worst-case model declines. Hansen and Sargent (2004) recommend choosing values of µ¡1
that correspond to detection-error probabilities from 10 to 25 per cent, on a case-by-case
basis. For the FM model, this range suggest values of µ¡1 from 0.66 to 0.55.

































































































































































µ¡1 corresponding to detection-error probabilities of 10 and 25 per cent are 0.2 and 0.11,
respectively.
163.3 E®ects of concerns for robustness on monetary policy
Table 1: FM Model: how coe±cients of the simple rule vary with µ¡1
µ¡1 ½i ½¼ ½x
0 0.8629 0.9594 0.5316
0.1000 0.8524 1.0238 0.4962
0.2000 0.8390 1.1059 0.4581
0.3000 0.8222 1.2114 0.4161
0.4000 0.7993 1.3605 0.3696
0.5000 0.7666 1.5883 0.3162
Table 1 shows how the coe±cients of the rule change as we increase µ¡1 from 0 to 0.5 when
the reference model is the FM model. Recall that when µ¡1 = 0, there is no concern for
robustness. The optimal rule in that case requires the policy-maker to put a weight of 0.86
on interest rate inertia and weights of 0.96 and 0.53 on contemporaneous in°ation and the
output gap, respectively. But as µ¡1 increases, optimal policy changes in three ways: ¯rst,
the policy-maker gives less and less importance to interest rate inertia; second, the policy-
maker responds with a smaller weight to contemporaneous output gap; and third, the policy-
maker responds more aggressively to contemporaneous in°ation. Why does that happen?
Figure 6 shows how the dynamic responses of in°ation, the output gap, and interest rate
vary with respect to the two shocks in the FM model: ²w;t, the real contract price shock, and
²x;t, the output gap shock. We see that in contrast to the approximating model, the worst-
case model when µ¡1 = 0:5 makes the e®ect of a real contract price shock and output gap
shock on in°ation and output more persistent. Indeed, in the worst-case model, a contract
price shock increases in°ation more importantly than the approximating model, and its
e®ect takes 25 quarters to die out (relative to 17 quarters in the approximating model). On
the other hand, a real contract price shock yields a more pronounced decline in the output
gap, and the e®ect dies out after more than 30 quarters (relative to 28 in the approximating
model). Similarly, the worst-case model also makes the e®ects of an output gap shock on
in°ation and the output gap bigger and more persistent. By virtue of those more important
and persistent positive e®ects on in°ation and more important persistent declines in the
output gap, the optimal policy rule in the worst-case model is to respond more aggressively
to contemporaneous in°ation and less aggressively to the contemporaneous output gap.
Note that although the policy-maker chooses a lower degree of inertia, the worst-case model
prescribes more important positive e®ects on the interest rate. The worst-case model also
makes the e®ects of an output gap shock bigger and more persistent.













real contract price shock


















































Figure 6: FM model: Approximating model vs worst-case model (µ = 0:5)
Table 2 displays the coe±cients of the policy rule for various choices of µ¡1 for the
Dennis model. When there is no concern for robustness, the optimal policy rule requires a
high degree of inertia in the interest rate (0.95), a relatively high weight to contemporaneous
in°ation (1.89), and a moderate response to the output gap (0.66). When we increase µ¡1, we
¯rst notice that for µ¡1 = 0:22 (the size of µ¡1) corresponding to a detection-error probability
of 25 per cent, the optimal policy rule remains virtually unchanged. Even for very high values
of µ¡1, which according to the detection-error probability criterion is too high, we end up
with policy rules that are quantitatively quite close to the µ¡1 = 0 rule. Figure 7 con¯rms
why this is the case. The dotted lines are the impulse responses of the worst-case model
when µ¡1 = 10. We see that even for a high value of µ¡1, the worst-case model predicts
that in°ation and the output gap respond to the output gap shock and in°ation shock with
almost the same magnitude and the same persistence as the approximating model. As a
result, the optimal policy rule that works best in the worst-case model also works well in
18Table 2: How coe±cients of the simple rule vary with µ¡1
µ¡1 ½i ½¼ ½x
0 0.9502 1.8859 0.6607
0.22 0.9501 1.8862 0.6604
1.00 0.9498 1.8870 0.6596
5.00 0.9482 1.8912 0.6552
10.00 0.9461 1.8966 0.6497
30.00 0.9367 1.9191 0.6262
50.00 0.9255 1.9432 0.6008
70.00 0.9122 1.9691 0.5729
100.00 0.8878 2.0115 0.5250
the approximating model.
The above result illustrates one stand on which the robust control approach to dealing
with model uncertainty has been criticized. Robust control assumes that the policy-maker's
approximating model is a good reference model. The reference model posits the structural
features of the economy and robust control constructs a set of models in the neighbourhood
of that model for decision making. A sensible degree of robustness (a sensible µ¡1), however,
may yield a set of models that do not di®er much from the approximating model. While
this may be suitable when the policy-maker is con¯dent that the reference model captures
the main features of the economy, it may not as suitable when the policy-maker has more
than one reference model that behaves di®erently.
From a practical point of view, it is in fact not unusual for policy-makers in central banks
to be willing to consider predictions from di®erent models that emphasize di®erent economic
paradigms to reduce the risk of policy errors (Engert and Selody 1998). Indeed, central banks
are often composed of di®erent departments, each of which uses a particular model to inform
their policy judgment. At the Bank of Canada, for instance, although QPM has been the
main model used for policy analysis over the past decade, the MFA Department has used
the M1-VECM model - a model based on the paradigm that there is a unique cointegrating
relationship between M1, real GDP, the consumer price index, and the interest rate - to
produce the Blue Book. Perhaps more importantly, signi¯cant resources are currently being
devoted to developing new DSGE models for policy analysis. MFA, for instance, is currently
developing a model that will emphasize household sector ¯nancial frictions in the economy
(Gammoudi and Mendes 2005). The Research Department is currently developing TOTEM
19(Binette, Murchison, Perrier, and Rennison 2004) - a new model that will be used for both
economic projections and policy analysis. Since these models will be non-nested models, it is
probably not far-fetched to imagine that they will have di®erent predictions along di®erent
economic dimensions.7 So, how should the Bank deal with model uncertainty when it does
not have one but two or more reference models that it considers relevant for policy making?
In the next section, we present various approaches for making decisions when the policy-
maker considers more than one model for policy-making.


























































Figure 7: CEE model: Approximating model vs worst-case model ( µ = 10)
4. Multiple-Model Approaches
Suppose that the true data-generating model is G, but that the policy-maker does not know
it. Suppose also that, being faced with competing theories suggesting di®erent models, the
7The models cited in this paragraph are not an exhaustive list of the models that can be used for policy
analysis at the Bank of Canada. Ortega and Rebei (2005), for instance, can analyze optimal policy in the
context of a multi-sector small open-economy model estimated for the Canadian economy.
20policy-maker ¯nds it di±cult to settle on a particular model. As a result, suppose that the
policy-maker considers fGk;k = 1;:::;ng as the set of distinct plausible models, albeit with
varying degrees of belief. Assume that ¼k is the weight that the policy-maker attaches to
the relevance of model k such that
P
k ¼k = 1.
Moreover, suppose that the policy-maker is given a set of feasible rules,
fK(°);° 2 ¡g; (36)
and a loss function,
vk(°) = V (Gk;K(°));
which measures the loss of applying the rule K(°) when the model is Gk. The policy-maker's
objective is to ¯nd one rule, say K(^ °), that minimizes the loss given the policy-maker's
inability to decide between the competing models.
4.1 Bayesian approach
One possible method of designing a rule that works reasonably well is to minimize the





What the Bayesian criterion says is that in the face of various plausible models, the policy-
maker, believing in each model, should simply try to do well on average. This approach
has the advantage that the least plausible models are given the least weight in the decision
process. Therefore, it is consistent with the idea that a rule that does not perform very
well in a particular model is permissible if that particular model is not very plausible; what
matters most is that the rule performs reasonably well in the models that are more likely
to be relevant. A disadvantage, however, is that there is no notion that the agent may care
about something more than the average performance. In particular, there is no notion that
the policy-maker may be unwilling to accept rules that yield very bad performances in some
models even though they may perform well on average. Therefore, there is no notion that
the agent may, per se, want to achieve some robustness.
To see how this can be pertinent, consider Figure 8. Figure 8 considers a policy-maker
who seeks to control the variability of in°ation by changing the policy instrument, the





























Figure 8: The Bayesian approach
interest rate, with respect to changes in in°ation. The policy-maker has two competing
reference models for policy-making. Model 1 requires that the policy-maker change the
interest rate by 1.9 per cent with respect to a 1 per cent change in in°ation, while Model 2
requires that the policy-maker change the interest rate by 0.4 per cent, thus less aggressively.
Notice, however, that Model 2 is much more sensitive to policy changes than Model 1: small
increases in the interest rate above 0.4 per cent lead to relatively large increases in the
variance of in°ation. In a situation like this, one can ask: should a policy-maker care only
about average performance, or should they also care about preventing those policy choices
that can lead to extreme performances in Model 2? If the policy-maker values robustness,
then the dotted curve illustrates that the Bayesian approach may not be appropriate. The
dotted curve corresponds to a case where the policy-maker assigns a weight of 0.9 to Model
1. The optimal Bayesian policy in that case is to change the interest rate by 1.4 per cent in
response to a 1 per cent change in in°ation. This performs well on average given the beliefs
of the policy-maker, but it leads to very variable in°ation in Model 2.
224.2 Worst-case approach
An alternative approach that can yield robustness in the context of distinct models is the
worst-case approach. In the worst-case approach, the policy-maker chooses policy according
to the following criterion:
wc(°) = maxfv1(°);v2(°);:::;vn(°)g: (38)
What the criterion above entails can again be illustrated by way of an example. Consider




























Figure 9: The worst-case approach
again the policy-maker with Model 1 and Model 2 as competing reference models for the
economy. With the worst-case approach, the policy-maker's objective is to ensure that
the policy decision rule works reasonably well no matter which of the two models is true.
To do that, the policy-maker contemplates the policy choices and determines which model
fares the worst under each of these choices. Therefore, for the example in Figure 9, the
policy-maker determines that, for changes in the interest rate of less than 0.55 per cent,
the highest variability of in°ation that can arise is given by Model 1 (thicker section of the
dotted curve) and conversely, for changes in the interest rate of more than 0.55 per cent,
23the highest variability of in°ation that can arise is given by Model 2 (thicker section of the
solid curve). Therefore, the policy choice that would minimize the variability of in°ation,
irrespective of Model 1 or Model 2 being the true model, is a change in the interest rate of
0.55 per cent.
The main advantage of the worst-case approach is that it does not require the decision-
maker to have beliefs about the plausibility of each model for decision making. Although
there are techniques for assigning weights to competing models, it may not always be easy
for the policy-maker to formulate priorities over a set of models. Therefore, a nice feature
of the worst-case approach is that it can be applied even when the decision-maker cannot
determine a reliable priority over a set of models. This property, however, turns out to
be a drawback when the policy-maker does have information that can help discriminate
between models. In that case, by neglecting information that may be relevant for assessing
the plausibility of each model, the worst-case approach can lead to corner solutions (as in
our example) that are much more restrictive than necessary, especially if the model leading
to the corner solution is not very plausible.
4.3 Trade-o® between average performance and robustness
The worst-case approach can lead to robust decision rules that may be too conservative,
whereas the Bayesian approach yields decision rules that may not be su±ciently robust
although they perform well on average. An approach that balances the desire for good
average performance and a concern for robustness is suggested in Cateau (2005). Cateau
(2005) adapts the decision theory literature (see Klibano®, Marinacci, and Mukerji 2002;




¼kÁ( vk(°) ): (39)
The main feature of criterion (39) is that: (i) it incorporates the beliefs that the decision-
maker may have about each model, as in the Bayesian approach, and (ii) it allows the
decision-maker to distinguish between the within-model risk (the risk which arises naturally
because the model is stochastic) and the across-model risk (the risk which is associated
with the multiplicity of models). The decision-maker allows for the across-model risk by
evaluating the performance of a model not only by its loss (e.g. how much variability
of in°ation it leads to) but by a transform of that loss. That transform, as motivated by
Klibano®, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2002), re°ects the attitude of the decision-maker towards
24the across-model risk; basically, its curvature will represent the degree of aversion towards
the across-model risk.
The decision-maker's care about the across-model risk leads them to decide to achieve a
balance between average performance and robustness. Indeed, Cateau (2005) shows that his
framework nests both the Bayesian approach and the worst-case approach as special cases:
the Bayesian approach is the special case where the decision-maker is neutral to the across-
model risk (the decision-maker's degree of aversion towards the across-model risk is 0), and
the worst-case approach is the special case where the decision-maker's degree of aversion
towards the across-model risk is in¯nite. Therefore, the degree of aversion towards the
across-model risk which re°ects the attitude of the decision-maker towards model uncertainty
determines the extent to which the decision-maker wants to trade-o® average performance
for robustness.





























































Figure 10: Aversion to across-model risk
Figure 10 shows how accounting for the across-model risk helps the policy-maker to balance
25performance and robustness. I assume that the policy-maker re-evaluates the performance
of a particular model by transforming the variability of in°ation it leads to, say x, according
to a function, Á(x), which exhibits constant absolute across-model risk aversion,8 ´. When
´ = 0, the policy-maker is neutral to the across-model risk and therefore adopts a Bayesian
approach for dealing with indecision between Model 1 and Model 2. The solid curves in the
upper panel, as before, show how much variability of in°ation, Model 1 and Model 2, lead
to under each policy choice. As in Figure 8, when the policy-maker assigns a weight of 0.9
to Model 1, the optimal policy choice is to change the interest rate by 1.4 per cent with
respect to a 1 per cent change in in°ation (the solid curve in the lower panel). When the
policy-maker is averse to the across-model risk, the aversion forces the policy-maker to add
a risk premium to the cost of each model under each policy choice. The upper panel shows
that increasing the degree of aversion to the across-model risk shifts the loss pro¯le of Model
2 upwards in a quantitatively more important way than that of Model 1. As a result, even
after giving a weight of 0.9 to Model 1, the more averse the policy-maker becomes, the more
the policy-maker prefers less aggressive policy to avoid bad performances in Model 2 (the
dotted and dashed curves reach their minimum at smaller changes in the interest rate). It
is in this sense that accounting for the across-model risk induces the policy-maker to search
for more robust policy.
4.3.1 Implementing the trade-o® approach
The trade-o® approach described above assumes that (i) the policy-maker can assign weights
to the models in the decision set, and (ii), the policy-maker knows their own degree of
aversion towards the across-model risk. To implement the approach, it is therefore important
to determine those parameters. Section 4.3.1 shows how one can use Bayes law to calculate
model weights from the data starting from a certain prior on the set of models. Section 4.3.1
shows how one can proceed to give economic meaning to the degree of aversion towards the
across-model risk.
Determining weights for models









8Figure 10 assumes that Á(x) =
exp(´x)¡1
´ such that ´ denotes the degree of aversion towards the across-
model risk.
9Think of this transition equation as resulting from the policy-maker's linear-quadratic control problem
if the model is i.
26where xi
t is a vector of state variables that may be completely or only partially observed, and
²i






be the vector of observable state variables.
Now suppose that ¼i;0 = P(mi) is the initial probability that the policy-maker assigns
to model i as time 0. The policy-maker can revise that probability at time t after observing










Therefore, the posterior probability, ¼i;t, for model i is proportional to the marginalized
likelihood of the data according to model i weighted by the initial prior for model i. To
develop a recursion for ¼i;t, it is in fact easier to ¯rst develop a recursion for ®i;t and then







Under the state space form (40) for model i and the assumption of normality for ²i
t+1, we
can use the Kalman ¯lter to construct the marginalized likelihood in the numerator and
denominator. In fact, if ²i












Therefore, ®i;t+1 gets updated every period according to the contribution that the time t+1
piece of data, yt+1, makes to the marginalized likelihood. With normality, given data yt,
27yt+1 is normally distributed with mean yt+1jyt and variance ¢t+1.10 So, given a starting
value ®i;0 at time 0, we can use (45) to update ®i;t every period. We can then calculate the






Figure 11 uses quarterly data on in°ation and the output gap from 2000Q1 to update





















Figure 11: Updating probability weights of model
weights to the CEE and FM model. Initially, the models are assigned equal weights, but as
new data arrived, the weights to each model are recalculated using equations (45) and (46).
The weight to the FM model initially declines, but we see that after 6 quarters of data have
been accumulated, the statistical evidence in favour of the FM model causes its weight to
converge to 1.
10Appendix C explains how we can use the Kalman ¯lter to construct yt+1jyt and ¢t+1.
28Determining the degree of aversion towards the across-model risk
To pin down the degree of across-model risk aversion, we proceed in analogy to risk the-
ory. In risk theory, to interpret the size of the risk-aversion parameter, it is related to the
risk premium that the decision maker would be prepared to pay to be indi®erent between
accepting a small risk or obtaining a non-random amount for sure.
So suppose that the policy-maker wants to achieve a loss of v¤. However, the policy-
maker faces N models that suggest losses vi, with probability ¼i, i = 1;:::;N. In an analogy
to risk theory, we can ask: how much of a premium, ±, would the policy-maker be ready
to pay to be indi®erent between achieving v¤ for sure or else face model uncertainty and,
hence, N possible di®erent losses with probability ¼i. That is,
Á(v




Now suppose that Á(x) is the exponential function given by Á(x) = e´x¡1
´ such that ´ =
Á00(x)
Á0(x)




´(vi¡v¤¡±) = 1: (48)
Equation (48) denotes the relationship between ´ and ±. Given the set of probabilities
attached to the models, the loss, v¤, and the premium, ±, that the policy-maker is ready to
pay to achieve v¤, we can solve numerically for ´ as a function of these parameters. Two
caveats are in order: ¯rst, there need not be a unique ´ that solves (48). This follows since
the left-hand side of (48) need not be monotonic in ´. Second, if we take the total derivative











d½ can in general be positive or negative depending on the ¼i's, v¤, ´ and ±. These
concerns appear in the risk literature and it should not come as a surprise that they appear
here as well. Indeed, just as it is known that agents do not necessarily react to a bet on $10
as they would to a bet on $1 million, the policy-maker need not react in the same way in
situations where models exhibit small or big losses. Equation (48) is nevertheless useful if
29we want to characterize how the degree of aversion to across-model risk behaves when the
risk in question can potentially be large.
Conversely, we may be interested to know how ´ behaves with respect to slight across-
model risk. Rewrite (47) as
Á(v
¤ + ±) = EÁ(~ v) (50)
where v¤ is the non-stochastic loss that the policy-maker wants to achieve, E denotes expec-
tation with respect to the prior over models, and ~ v is the random variable representing the
loss of each model. Taking a ¯rst-order approximation of the left-hand side of (50) around
v¤, we obtain
Á(v




Taking a second-order approximation of the right-hand side of (50) around v¤, we obtain
EÁ(~ v) = Á(v
¤) + Á
0(v






¤)E(~ v ¡ v
¤)
2: (52)
Equating (51) and (52) and noting that
Á00(v¤)




E(~ v ¡ v
¤)




± + v¤ ¡ E~ v
1
2E(~ v ¡ v¤)2: (54)
Therefore, in the neighbourhood of a given non-stochastic v¤,
d´
d½ > 0. Hence, the larger the
premium that the policy-maker is willing to pay to achieve v¤, the more the policy-maker is
averse to the across-model risk.
Equation (54) tells us how to calculate the local degree of across-model risk aversion,
while (48) tells us how to obtain a measure of the degree of aversion in the large. Both
equations yield a relationship of ´ as a function of ±. So (54) and (48) can help us determine
a sensible ´ provided that we can sensibly pin down ±, the premium that the policy-maker
is willing to pay in the face of model uncertainty. This is not without di±culty; however, it
should be far easier to determine such a premium than to directly determine the degree of
across-model risk aversion. Why this is the case can be illustrated by the following example.
Suppose that the policy-maker considers two models of the economy and cares only about
controlling in°ation. Prior to choosing monetary policy, suppose that Model 1 predicts that
30a particular policy choice will yield a squared deviation of in°ation from target of 0.1 per
cent, while Model 2 predicts that the same policy choice will yield a squared deviation of 10
per cent. Suppose further that the policy-maker's objective is to achieve a squared deviation
of 3 per cent. To deduce the premium that the policy-maker would be willing to pay to
eliminate model uncertainty, we can ask the following question: Given that the squared
deviation of in°ation from target can be either 0.1 or 10 per cent tomorrow, what is the
maximum squared deviation you would tolerate today if we could guarantee that tomorrow
we will have a single model that tells us how to achieve the 3 per cent squared deviation?
Suppose that the policy-maker would tolerate a squared deviation of 5 per cent. Then the
premium that the policy-maker would be ready to pay to eliminate model uncertainty and
achieve 3 per cent squared deviation for sure is 5 - 3 = 2 per cent. Once we know the
premium that the policy-maker is willing to pay, we can then determine the policy maker's
degree of across-model risk aversion from (54) or (48).
A di®erent strategy for implementing the trade-o® approach to work is to assume a
particular degree of aversion and work backwards from (53) to determine the across-model
risk premium that corresponds to the assumed degree of aversion. When repeated for various
degrees of aversion, that exercise will lead to a pro¯le linking each degree of aversion to the
corresponding premium that the policy-maker would tolerate to eliminate model uncertainty.
That pro¯le is likely to be more useful from a policy-making perspective because, instead of
being asked to quote a particular across-model risk premium, the policy-maker can directly
see the e®ect of increasing or decreasing the across-model degree of risk aversion on the
premium.
4.4 Trade-o® between the CEE and FM model
We now implement the trade-o® approach for the policy-maker that views the CEE model
and the FM model as two plausible models of the Canadian economy. We assume that the
policy-maker values both models equally and assigns equal weight to them. The policy-
maker's across-model risk aversion is captured by the function Á(x) = e´x¡1
´ . The policy-
maker's decision problem is to choose policy according to the simple rule (26) given the
two models considered plausible and across-model risk aversion. Table 3 displays how the
coe±cients of the policy rule vary with ´. The last two columns display the losses that
the optimal policy rule lead to in each model. When ´ = 0, the policy-maker uses the
Bayesian criterion to choose policy. The optimal policy rule arrived at leads to a loss of
0.12 in the CEE model, while it leads to a loss of 0.49 in the FM model. Since the policy
31Table 3: Simple rule coe±cients, the degree of across-model risk aversion and model losses
´ ½i ½¼ ½x loss CEE loss FM
0 0.785 1.337 0.496 0.1138 0.4932
0.5 0.794 1.292 0.502 0.1144 0.4926
1 0.803 1.250 0.507 0.1152 0.4920
1.5 0.811 1.210 0.511 0.1159 0.4916
2 0.818 1.173 0.514 0.1167 0.4912
3 0.831 1.112 0.517 0.1181 0.4906
5 0.847 1.031 0.520 0.1203 0.4901
7 0.855 0.989 0.520 0.1217 0.4899
10 0.861 0.961 0.520 0.1226 0.4899
15 0.863 0.950 0.520 0.1230 0.4899
20 0.864 0.948 0.520 0.1231 0.4899
25 0.864 0.947 0.520 0.1231 0.4899
30 0.864 0.947 0.520 0.1231 0.4899
rule is more restrictive for the FM model than for the CEE model, increasing the degree
of aversion makes the policy-maker more worried about improving the performance of the
rule in the FM model. As a result, as we increase ´, the policy-maker chooses rules that
exhibit more inertia, a slightly higher contemporaneous response to the output gap but a
lower contemporaneous response to in°ation. These rules perform better in the FM model
but worse in the CEE model. It is in this sense that increasing ´ makes the policy-maker
more conservative and gradually convinces the policy-maker to act on a worst-case scenario.
Now that we know the e®ect of di®erent degrees of across-model risk aversion on the
optimal policy rule, it is important to interpret their economic signi¯cance. We do that by
computing the implied premium that each degree of aversion leads to. We use (54) and
(48) to compute the local premium (±l) and the global premium (±g), respectively. Table
4 assumes that v¤ = E~ (v). Therefore Table 4 computes the premium that the policy-
maker would be willing to pay ex ante (before resolving model uncertainty) to be certain of
achieving the average of the model losses ex post (after resolving model uncertainty). First
we see that ±g, the global premium, increases with ´ for the range of values considered.
Therefore, in our case, increasing the degree of across-model risk aversion implies that the
policy-maker is willing to pay a higher premium ex ante to resolve the model uncertainty.
From (54), the same holds for the local premium ±l. Second, we notice that ±l and ±g are
almost the same for small degrees of aversion. But at higher degrees of aversion (´ >= 10),
the local premium grows much faster than the global premium. Therefore, the local premium
32Table 4: Implied premiums and the degree of across-model risk aversion
´ average loss ±l ±g
0.5 0.3035 0.009 0.009
1 0.3036 0.018 0.018
1.5 0.3037 0.027 0.026
2 0.3039 0.035 0.034
3 0.3043 0.052 0.050
5 0.3052 0.086 0.076
7 0.3058 0.119 0.096
10 0.3062 0.169 0.117
15 0.3065 0.252 0.138
20 0.3065 0.336 0.149
25 0.3065 0.420 0.156
30 0.3065 0.504 0.160
is less reliable at higher degrees of aversion. This is not surprising. Higher ´'s imply that
Á(x), the function that the policy-maker uses to re-evaluate models because of across-model
risk aversion has much more curvature to it. Therefore, local linear approximations are less
accurate.
How can Table 4 be used for policy analysis? Recall that the loss function in the calcu-
lations above is a weighted average of the squared deviations of in°ation, output gap, and
the change in the interest rate. Column 2 in the table shows the average of the model losses
which we assume the policy-maker would be happy to achieve. By adding the average loss
and ±g (or ±l, which is less accurate but easier to compute), we obtain the maximum loss
that the policy-maker would tolerate to resolve model uncertainty ex ante. So once we have
the pro¯le linking ´ to the maximum tolerable loss, the policy-maker can select the value
of ´, say ´¤ that yields a reasonable maximum tolerable loss. We can then compute the
optimal policy rule that ´¤ leads to.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed some recent methods for dealing with model uncertainty.
We presented the theoretical ideas behind each method, illustrated what each method does
through simple examples but also discussed why and when a particular method may be
more appropriate than the other. But we did not limit ourselves to a theoretical discussion.
We also showed how to compute the various parameters that a theoretical discussion takes
33for granted and we have also worked through the implementation using as benchmark two
models of the Canadian economy. Now we summarize the key points of our discussion and
also suggest some ways, which we believe can be implemented in the short and medium term,
in which our analysis can be used to help the Bank of Canada deal with model uncertainty.
Dealing with Model Uncertainty:
² Robust control is most useful when the policy-maker has one good model of the econ-
omy; by de¯nition, it is designed to choose decision rules that work well in a neigh-
bourhood of a particular model.
² When the policy-maker has competing reference models of the economy, the Bayesian
approach, worst-case model approach, and the trade-o® approach of Cateau (2005)
are likely to perform better than robust control since they take into account that the
policy-maker may, in fact, use models that are arbitrarily far from each other.
² The critical distinction between the Bayesian approach, worst-case approach, and
Cateau's approach is that they make di®erent assumptions about the attitude of the
policy-maker towards model uncertainty. The Bayesian approach assumes that the
policy-maker is neutral to the across-model risk, only caring about average perfor-
mance; the worst-case model approach assumes that the policy-maker is in¯nitely
averse to the across-model risk, only caring about how robust the policy choice is;
Cateau (2005) allows the aversion of the policy-maker to vary between zero (Bayesian)
and in¯nity (worst-case) - the policy-maker's degree of aversion determines how much
the policy-maker trades o® average performance for robustness.
Some Proposals:
² Robust control for TOTEM. TOTEM will be the main model used by Bank sta®
for policy exercises. Depending on how reasonable it is to consider TOTEM as the
reference model for policy-making at the Bank of Canada, robust control will provide
policy rules that are robust to misspeci¯cation within a certain distance of TOTEM.
To put this in practice, we will need to specify the size of the set of models surrounding
TOTEM for which we want robust rules (i.e., » in Figure 2). We show in section 2.4
how we can compute that parameter.
34² Robust control for sensitivity analysis. At the FAD meetings, representatives of de-
partments at the Bank are often asked not only for their perspective on the current and
future state of the Canadian economy but also about the con¯dence of their assess-
ment. Robust control can be used for sensitivity analysis relative to misspeci¯cation.
If the department, for instance, uses a model for predicting how in°ation would re-
spond to a cost-push shock, the department can also calculate how in°ation would
respond if its model is subject to misspeci¯cation. That response can be calculated
for various degrees of misspeci¯cation to get an idea of how robust the prediction is.
² Optimal policy rule with competing models. With the development of TOTEM and
MFA's ¯nancial frictions model, for example, the Bank will soon have di®erent mod-
els providing di®erent pictures of the Canadian economy that can be used for policy
analysis. What kind of policy rules should the Bank use when there is model uncer-
tainty? C^ ot¶ e, Kuszczak, Lam, Liu, and St-Amant (2002) analyze the performance
and robustness of some simple policy rules in twelve models of the Canadian economy.
While their analysis shows that Taylor-type rules, interest rate smoothing rules, and
open economy rules are not robust (at least in the set of models that they consider),
their approach is not useful to answer the question asked above. Indeed, they consider
simple policy rules optimized for a particular model and evaluate how it performs in
the other models. A more useful way to derive a policy rule that works well across
various models is to start with a general type of policy rule and evaluate how it per-
forms relative to a criterion that involves all the models in the decision set of the
policy-maker. In fact, if we use the criterion that Cateau (2005) suggests, we can seek
to answer a more interesting question: what kind of policy rules should the bank use
to achieve a certain trade-o® between average performance and robustness when it
faces model uncertainty? Of course, the trade-o® will depend on the policy-maker's
aversion to model uncertainty, so it will be important to estimate the policy-maker's
degree of aversion. We suggest two approaches in section 4.3.1 to determine the degree
of across-model risk aversion.
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37Appendix A: Robustness in Forward-Looking Models
Forward-looking models di®er from backward-looking ones (also known as the linear regu-
lator problem in the literature) in that part of the state is not inherited from the past but
are jump variables; i.e., variables that need to adjust for a solution to a stabilizing solution
to exist. To solve a forward-looking problem, however, knowing how to solve a backward-
looking problem is still very useful because many of the objects that appear in the solution
to the backward-looking problem are the same ones that we need to construct the solution
to the forward-looking problem. So below, we introduce the forward-looking problem and in
section A.1, solve the problem just as if it was a linear regulator problem. In section A.1.2,
however, we show how to obtain the solution to the forward-looking problem.






be the state vector at time t. The Yt are natural state variables in the
sense that they are inherited from the past. The Zt are forward-looking state variables (such
as those coming from the Euler equations of the private sector in a Ramsey problem, for
example) that need to be determined by the model at time t. Suppose that the policy-
maker's approximating model is given by
Xt+1 = AXt + BUt + C²t+1 (A1)
where the Ut are the policy-maker's control and ²t is an i.i.d. shock process with mean 0










As before, without a concern for robustness, the objective of the policy-maker is to minimize
(A2) subject to (A1) and given Y0. 1 The policy-maker, however, doubts the model. As a
result, the policy-maker considers the approximating model to be a good approximation of
the data-generating model that falls in the set of models given by
Xt+1 = AXt + BUt + C(²t+1 + !t+1); (A3)
1Notice, that since the Zt are forward-looking variables and not inherited from the past, there are no
initial conditions Z0.
38where ²t is an i.i.d. shock process with mean 0 and identity covariance matrix. Robust



















subject to (A3) and given Y0.














t+1(AXt + BUt + C!t+1 ¡ Xt+1)
ª
: (A5)
Notice, that we have dropped the expectation sign and ²t from the problem above. This is
because, a version of certainty equivalence continues to apply owing to the linear quadratic
nature of the robust control problem. The ¯rst-order conditions with respect to Ut, Xt, and
!t+1 are given by:
0 = RUt + ¯B
0¹t+1
¹t = QXt + ¯A
0¹t+1
0 = ¯µ!t+1 ¡ ¯C
0¹t+1:
Solving the f.o.c.'s for Ut and !t+1 and substituting in (A3) yields











. We can rewrite (A6) as
Xt+1 = AXt ¡ ¯ ~ B ~ R
¡1 ~ B
0¹t+1: (A7)
Collecting (A7) and (A6), we have the system of di®erence equations:
"















2Extremization is the term used for the optimization problem where we both minimize and maximize





















The stabilizing solution is attained for a P such that ¹0 = PX0 where P solves the Riccati
equation connected to the system of di®erence equations (A9). The solution ¹0 = PX0
replicates itself over time in the sense that
¹t = PXt: (A10)
A.1.1 Riccati equation
We mention above that ¯nding a solution to (A9) involves ¯nding a P which solves the
Riccati equation connected to (A9). What is the Riccati equation and how do we ¯nd P?
In practice, we can ¯nd P by using one of the invariant subspace methods documented in
Hansen and Sargent (2004). This involves locating the stable invariant subspace of the
matrix pencil ¸L¡N of system (A9). We do this by ¯rst taking the matrices L and N and
computing the generalized Schur decomposition of the pencil ¸L¡N. We can then construct
P from the matrix of right Schur eigenvectors after carefully reordering the eigenvectors in
terms of the stable and unstable eigenvalues.
Another approach for computing P is to solve the Riccati equation connected to (A9).
The Riccati equation is more easily derived by writing down the Bellman equation of the
dynamic problem. The Bellman equation associated to the dynamic problem (A4) is











¤ = AX + BU + Cw: (A12)
Since the objective is quadratic, and the constraint linear, we conjecture that the value
40function is also quadratic3:
V (X) = X
0PX: (A13)
Consider the inner maximization with respect to !. Substituing (A13) for V (X¤) and













! = (µI! ¡ C
0PC)
¡1C
0P(AX + BU): (A16)
Substituting (A15) in (A12), we get
X
¤ = (I ¡ µ
¡1CC
0P)(AX + BU): (A17)
Using (A17) and (A15) and some algebraic manipulations, we can solve for D(P). The
result is










Having solved for the inner maximization, we can now solve the outer minimization problem.






0RU + ¯(AX + BU)
0D(P)(AX + BU)g: (A19)
Equation (A19) illustrates how a concern for robustness modi¯es the problem of the policy-
maker. Basically, it modi¯es the Bellman equation of the policy-maker by distorting the
continuation value of the value function according to D. The f.o.c. for U implies that




3We rely on certainty equivalence to solve the non-stochastic version of the robust control problem. The
same P solves both the stochastic and non-stochastic problem. The stochastic problem, however, adds a
scalar to the value function i.e., V (X) = X0PX + p. We can easily show that p =
¯
1¡¯trace(CC0P).
41So, de¯ning F = ¡(R+¯B0D(P)B)¡1B0D(P)A and substituting U = FX in (A19), we get
a recursion for P:
P = Q + F
0RF + ¯(A + BF)
0D(P)(A + BF)







Denote T(v) as the operator







Those familiar with solving dynamic linear quadratic control problems will recognize that
the operator above appears in typical dynamic linear quadratic problems where there is no
concern for robustness. Indeed, we solve for the value function by ¯nding the ¯xed point
of T(v) = v, the so-called Riccati equation. The usefulness of de¯ning the operator above
is that it illustrates how a desire for robustness a®ects the ordinary Bellman equation. A
concern for robustness modi¯es the ordinary Riccati equation by ¯nding the ¯xed point of
T(D(P)) = P with D given by (A18) rather than T(P) = P.
The P that solves the Riccati equation (A21) is the same P that will result from using
the invariant subspace methods (again, see Hansen and Sargent 2004) to solve the system
(A9). These di®erent solution methods determine di®erent solution algorithms, and the
one we pick usually depends on the degree of accuracy or e±ciency we require. Whichever
method we use, once we obtain P we obtain the solutions U = FX and ! = KX where




K = (µI! ¡ C
0PC)
¡1C
0P(A + BF): (A24)
A.1.2 Constructing the solution to the forward-looking problem
In a typical linear regulator problem, Xt is a state vector inherited from the past at time t,





and only Yt are inherited
from the past. Zt, on the other hand, are jump state variables that need to adjust for
a solution to exist. Suppose that the dimension of Yt and Zt are ny and nz, respectively.









variables associated with the state variables Xt, the system is of order 2(ny+nz). Therefore,
42for a solution to exist, we need 2(ny +nz) boundary conditions. Since the dynamic problem
is of in¯nite horizon, the terminal states are unspeci¯ed. We obtain ny + nz boundary





At time 0, Y0 is given. This gives us ny initial conditions. However, because the Zt are
forward-looking variables, at time 0, we cannot take Z0 as given. We obtain the missing
nz boundary conditions by imposing initial conditions for the co-state variables associated
with Zt; i.e., ¹z
t. But now, what initial conditions do we impose for ¹z
0? Following Currie
and Levine (1993), it can be shown that the value function is decreasing in ¹z
t. Therefore,
it is optimal to set ¹z
0 = 0.4
Recall that the solution to (A9) is
¹t = PXt;















































Now, since Ut = FXt and !t+1 = KXt with F and K given by (A23) and (A24), respectively,
4This pinpoints why there is a time-consistency problem in forward-looking problems. The policy-maker's
loss function is decreasing in ¹z
t. At time 0, since ¹z
0 must be non-negative, it is optimal to set it equal to
0. But from (A9) and ¹t = PXt, starting from ¹z
0 = 0, ¹z
t is non-zero forever after. Therefore, there is an
incentive for the policy-maker to reset ¹z
¿ = 0 for any ¿ > 0. This is the time-consistency problem.









































































Finally, for the stochastic problem, we can show that the value function in terms of the

























~ p = trace( ~ PCC
0): (A33)
A.2 A simple rule
Suppose that instead of pursuing the Ramsey solution, the policy-maker chooses to set policy
according to a simple rule:
Ut = FXt: (A34)
Hence, the policy-maker's problem is to minimize the loss function (A2) subject to the
simple rule (A34) and the set of models (A3). The robust control problem with a simple



















For a given F, we can focus on determining the worst-case perturbation by solving the














¤Xt + C!t+1 ¡ Xt+1)
ª
; (A36)
where Q¤ = Q + F 0RF and A¤ = A + BF. The ¯rst order conditions with respect to !t+1,








¤Xt + C!t+1: (A39)






















The stabilizing solution is attained by ¯nding a P that solves the Riccati equation con-
nected to the system of di®erence equations (A41). Since ¹t = PXt is true in all periods,


















45As before, it is instructive to derive the Riccati equation via the Bellman equation associated
with the dynamic problem












¤X + C!: (A45)
For a given F, we conjecture a quadratic value function V (X) = X0PX. The ¯rst-order





Using the above in (A45) gives us
X












































Given our previous conjecture on the form of the value function, the Bellman equation can
















46Having determined the worst-case pertubation for a given simple rule F, we can then ¯nd
the rule that will minimize the loss function of the policy-maker. For the problem at hand,



























~ p = trace( ~ PCC
0); (A57)
and P and its submatrices solve (A54).
47Appendix B: An Alternative Algorithm for Solving
Forward-Looking Linear Quadratic
Robust Control
The solution methods presented above proceed by ¯rst ¯nding a P that stabilizes the system
given by full state and co-state of the economy (that is, including backward- and forward-
looking variables and their associated co-states). We then use P to characterize the law
of motion of the predetermined state variables, which is the solution we are ultimately
after. An alternative algorithm is to directly ¯nd the solution of a system composed of
only predetermined state variables. The next section outlines how this can be done. The
algorithm was more e±cient in solving the FM model for our parametrization of the model.


















subject to our approximating model, written in the form of a di®erence quation with one
lead and one lag:
H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + BUt + C!t+1 = 0: (B2)
















H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + BUt + C!t+1
ª
: (B3)
The ¯rst-order conditions are
Ut : ¯
tRUt + B
0¸t = 0 (B4)
!t+1 : ¡µ¯!t+1¯
t + C








3¸t¡1 = 0: (B6)
De¯ning ¹t = ¸t















¡1¹t¡1 = 0: (B9)
48By substituting the f.o.c.'s for Ut and !t+1 into the constraint (B2), we obtain

























































in terms of what is predetermined at time t.
At time t, Xt¡1 is inherited from the past; ¹t¡1 is the discounted t ¡ 1 shadow price of Xt
and thus known at t (at time 0 it is optimal to initialize ¹¡1 = 0). So we are looking for a
solution characterized by






. For the system
A1Yt¡1 + A2Yt + A3Yt+1 = 0; (B14)
let Yt = NtYt¡1. Substituing this into (B14), the solution becomes
Nt = ¡(A2 + A3Nt+1)
¡1A1: (B15)
To ¯nd a N that satis¯es (B13), we start with a guess for Nt+1 and iterate on (B15) until
convergence.
49Once we have solved the system of di®erence equations and obtained











we need to back out decision rules for Ut and !t+1. We obtain from the respective ¯rst-order


































B.1 Dynamics in a stochastic system
In this section we consider the problem recast as a stochastic system. Beginning with
H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + BUt + C!t+1 + C²t+1 = 0; (B21)
















+ C²t+1 = 0: (B22)
Using the fact that Yt+1 = NYt, we set
A1Yt¡1 + (A2 + A3N)Yt + C²t+1 = 0; (B23)
50and therefore
Yt = ¡(A2 + A3N)
¡1A1Yt¡1 ¡ (A2 + A3N)
¡1C²t+1 (B24)
= NYt¡1 + CN²t+1: (B25)
A1, A2, and A3 are exactly as in the non-stochastic case because of certainty equivalence.
If we take expectations at time t, ²t+1 = 0 and the last term drops out. Therefore, our
solutions to the non-stochastic and stochastic problems are equivalent.
51Appendix C: The Kalman Filter
Suppose that the state of the economy evolves according to
Xt+1 = AXt + C²t+1; (C1)
but assume that we observe only a subset of the state variables, possibly with some mea-
surement error
Yt+1 = ~ hXt+1 + ~ D²t+1
= ~ hAXt + (~ hC + ~ D)²t+1 (C2)
= hXt + D²t+1: (C3)
Let yt = [yt;yt¡1;yt¡2;:::;y0] be information available at time t. The best prediction of the
state at t + 1 given information at time t is:
Xt+1jyt = AXtjyt; (C4)
and the forecast error for Xt+1 is:
Xt+1 ¡ Xt+1jyt = A(Xt ¡ Xtjyt) + C²t+1:
The mean squared error of our forecast is:





Conversely, the best prediction of Yt+1 at time t is:
Yt+1jyt = hXtjyt: (C7)
The forecast error is
vt+1 = Yt+1 ¡ Yt+1jyt = h(Xt ¡ Xtjyt) + D²t+1:











Now, note that from linear projection theory,
Xt+1 = Xt+1jyt + ·t+1vt+1 + »t+1: (C11)
We are interested in deriving ·t+1. Take expectation given yt to obtain,












Given ·t+1 and (C11), we can then develop a recursion for updating our estimates of the
state and its mean square error. We do this by taking expectations of (C11) given yt+1. We
obtain
Xt+1jyt+1 = Xt+1jyt + ·t+1vt + 1: (C14)
Using (C11) and (C14), we can similarly obtain
­t+1jyt+1 = ­t+1jyt ¡ ·t+1¢t+1·
0
t+1: (C15)
(C14) and (C15) are the updating equations of the Kalman ¯lter. They tell us how to
update our estimates of the state and the associated MSE once a new piece of data arrives.
The Kalman ¯lter is useful in constructing the likelihood function. Recall that,
Yt+1 = Yt+1jyt + vt+1:
So the conditional distribution of Yt+1jyt is N(Yt+1jyt;¢t+1). Therefore, we can use the
Kalman ¯lter to write down the contribution of each piece of data to the likelihood function.
53Appendix D: Impulse Responses from a VAR
To estimate the historical impulse responses of in°ation, interest rates, and the output gap to
an interest rate shock, output gap shock, and in°ation shock, we estimate a restricted VAR
using data from 1980Q1 to 2005Q1. Our VAR is ordered as follows: in°ation, consumption
growth, log of real investment, output gap, log of nominal foreign exchange rate, and the 90-
day commercial paper rate. We also include the following exogenous variables: U.S. output
gap, U.S. in°ation, log of world commodity prices, and the federal funds rate. Finally, we
include a dummy variable that takes the value 1 from 1991Q1 to 2005Q1 to indicate the
period of explicit in°ation targeting in Canada.
We use historical data from the Bank of Canada's Quarterly Projection Model database.
Real variables are based on the GDP de°ator. Quarter-over-quarter in°ation and quarter-
over-quarter consumption growth are calculated as the ¯rst-di®erence of the log of GDP
de°ator and log of real consumption, respectively. We calculate the output-gap variables
as deviations of the log of real GDP from a linear quadratic trend. Finally, the foreign
exchange rate used is the log of the trade-weighted G6 nominal exchange rate. To illustrate,
an appreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to a basket of foreign currencies translates
to a decrease in the nominal exchange rate.
We estimate our restricted VAR by forcing some coe±cients to be zero and excluding
non-signi¯cant variables from the regression. Table D1 presents the equations we estimate
and the lag order of the included variables. A `0' indicates that the variable enters the
equation contemporaneously, a `1' indicates the ¯rst lag of the variable, and so on. Our
methodology and results are comparable to those in Murchison, Rennison, and Zhu (2004).
Figure D1 shows the impulse responses of in°ation, the output gap, and interest rates to an
interest rate shock, output gap shock, and in°ation shock.
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Figure D1: Historical impulse responses vs model-based impulse responses
Table D1: Benchmark VAR
Equations
inf grcons lrinv ogap lforexn r1n
inf 1 1 1 1 1
grcons 1 1 to 2 1
lrinv 1 to 2
ogap 1 to 2 1 1 1 to 2 1 to 2
Variables lforexn 1 2 1 1 to 2
r1n 1 1 1 1 to 2 1
ogapUS 0 0 to 1 0 to 1 0 to 1
infUS 0 0 0
lpcom 0 to 1 0 0 to 1 0
®r 0 to 1 1
dummy 0 0
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